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 Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 6 (September, 1980)
 THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE
 EQUILIBRIA WITH PUBLIC GOODS'
 BY THEODORE GROVES AND JOHN 0. LEDYARD
 In our previous paper, "Optimal A'location of Public Goods ...," [5] we presented a
 mechanism for determining efficient, public goods allocations when preferences are
 unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We
 proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets
 for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the
 mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not
 vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our
 conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl
 equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that
 at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 IN THE PAPER "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods..." [5] we presented an
 informationally decentralized mechanism for determining public goods allo-
 cations which relies on consumers correctly revealing their demands for public
 goods. The important feature of this mechanism is the fact that if consumers
 behave competitively in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in
 their choices of messages ("demands") to the mechanism, then, for a wide class of
 economies, equilibria will be Pareto optimal.
 It is now known that other mechanisms for public goods allocation also have the
 property that their (Nash) equilibria are Pareto optimal. Two such mechanisms
 are examined in the papers of Hurwicz [6]2 and Walker [9]. Another is the
 particularly simple one3 that chooses a level of public goods equal to the quantity
 demanded by consumers and assesses each consumer a constant, arbitrarily fixed,
 proportional share of the total cost. Although equilibria for this mechanism are
 efficient, they rarely exist! In this paper we show that, for a wide class of
 economies, an equilibrium under our mechanism exists and, thus, the Pareto
 optimality of equilibria is not a vacuous property.
 The strongest conjecture one might seek to prove is that equilibria under our
 mechanism exist whenever the economy has a Lindahl equilibrium. (Since Hur-
 wicz's [6] and Walker's [9] mechanisms have the property that Lindahl allocations
 are (Nash) equilibrium allocations, the conjecture is true for their mechanisms.)
 However, for our mechanism, the conjecture is false for an interesting economic
 reason. The tax rules of our mechanism, which assign cost shares for the public
 goods provided, may confiscate enough wealth from a consumer to leave him
 worse off than he would be consuming only his initial endowment.4 In extreme
 1 This paper is a revision of reference [16] in our earlier paper, Groves and Ledyard [5]. We
 gratefuliy acknowledge support by National Science Foundation Grants SOC775-21820 and SOC76-
 20953 and a Fairchild Foundation Grant at California Institute of Technology where Ledyard was a
 Fairchild Scholar. We also would like to thank the referees and Michael Rothschild whose notes [8]
 and comments prompted us to complete this work. All errors are, of course, our own.
 2 Hurwicz's paper was available in unpulished form in 1976.
 See Groves and Ledyard [5, Remark 4.3, p. 800].
 4 Lindahl allocations never leave a consumer worse off than at his initial endowment.
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 1488 T. GROVES AND J. 0. LEDYARD
 cases, his tax may be greater than his wealth and thus may bankrupt him. But this
 can occur only when too many resources are devoted to the production of public
 goods. Thus an additional assumption ruling out such cases, along with assump-
 tions sufficient to guarantee Lindahl equilibria exist, suffice to establish existence
 under our mechanism. The additional assumption is, approximately, that at all
 Pareto optimal allocations the amount of private goods consumption is greater
 than some small but strictly positive amount. Thus, most economies with a
 Lindahl equilibrium will have an equilibrium under our mechanism as well.
 In Section 2, we present the general model of a competitive private ownership
 economy with a government (or mechanism) and the specific government we
 developed in [5]. A heuristic example explaining how the bankruptcy problem can
 arise under standard assumptions is also given. In Section 3, the existence theorem
 delineating the economies having equilibria under the rules defining our
 mechanism is stated and proven.
 2. COMPETITIVE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ECONOMIES WITH GOVERNMENT
 2.1. The Economy
 We consider an Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy with public goods
 and a government. A bundle of L private goods is denoted by x, an element of RRL
 (L- dimensional Euclidean space), and a bundle of K public goods is denoted by y,
 an element of RK. Prices for private and public goods are denoted by p E RL and
 q E lRK, respectively, and a price system for all goods by s = (p, q) E RL+K.
 There are I , 3 consumers; each characterized by (i) a consumption set
 X7i R L+K (ii) a preference ordering c5 on X', and (iii) an initial endowment of
 private goods, w cE 11L. There are J producers; each characterized by a production
 set Zi c RL+K containing all technologically feasible input-output vectors zi =
 (z4, z4). Associated with each producer j is a profit share distribution (011)i with
 0 a, All s 1 and YZi 0"' = 1 where 0" is consumer i's share of firm j's profits.
 The distinction between private and public goods results from specifying that
 the total net production of public goods, :5 4j = zy, is consumed by each consumer
 whereas that of private goods, z, 4 = zx, is to be divided among the consumers.
 Thus we have the following definition.
 DEFINITION 2.1: An attainable allocation is an (I + 1 +J)-tuple {(xi), y, (415
 where x E R, ,y E RK and z E RL+K such that
 (i) (xl igy) E T', all i,
 (2.1) (ii) z' E Zj, all j, and
 (iii) [E (xi _ i), y] E Z.
 A private ownership economy is denoted by F -(,T, c1i i), (Z'), (91)}*
 5 The notation (x') denotes the I-tuple (xl, . . ., x'); similarlY for (zi) (o "), etc.
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 2.2. The Government
 In a private ownership economy, private goods are purchased by consumers in
 markets but public goods are purchased in markets only by a special agent-the
 government. The government must therefore (i) choose the quantity of each
 public good to purchase and (ii) raise through taxes the necessary funds to finance
 its purchases. Now, to perform these tasks efficiently, the government needs to
 obtain information about consumers' preferences. Thus we suppose the
 consumers communicate messages to the government that the government then
 uses to determine the public goods quantities and taxes in accordance with some
 fixed rules.
 Formally, a government G is specified by (i) a language or message space M, an
 abstract set, containing as elements all possible messages, m ', each consumer may
 send, (ii) an allocation rule, y : MI X RL+K - RK, which is a function of joint
 messages m = (ml, . . ., MI) and prices s = (p, q) specifying the quantities of the
 public goods to be purchased, and (iii) consumer tax rules, C': M x RL+K ,
 that specify each consumer's lump-sum tax as a function, also, of joint messages
 m and prices s. We may thus denote an arbitrary government by G=
 i,M,y(( ),<C )).
 2.3. Producer and Consumer Behavior
 As price-taking profit maximizers, each producer j is assumed to choose an
 input-output vector from his production set Zj that maximizes s * zi for given
 prices s.
 DEFINITION 2.2: (i) The supply correspondence of the jth firm, Xi: R L+K R L+K
 is defined by:
 qY(s) = {z' l Zjs * z' is maximal over Zi}.
 (ii) The profit function of the jth firm, r' :L+K R R, is defined by:
 17i(s)-s * Xi(s).
 Each consumer must choose a private goods consumption bundle x' E R L and a
 message m' E M to send the government. We assume consumers take as given the
 prices of all goods, their wealth, and the messages of all other consumers. They do
 consider, however, how their message affects the allocation of public goods and
 their tax. Thus, each chooses a decision pair (x', mi) to maximize preferences over
 consumption bundles (xi, y) subject to a budget constraint.
 DEFINITION 2.3: (i) The budget correspondence of the ith consumer,
 ~iMI-X1 L+K X LXM
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 is defined by 6
 i(mi I s i) _ {(i m ) RL x M?x y(m/-i)E
 p *J'+C'(m/m ', s) s w'}
 where wi is his wealth.
 (ii) The decision correspondence of the ith consumer, 8i MI-' x RL+K X R
 RL X M is defined by:
 3, (m ) ,s, w )-f, (x , m E ,3(m I SI s, w) I (x ,1 y (m/ m ))
 ?zi (x1, y(m/m')) for all (x, Ein) E (mI s, w)}
 2.4. Equilibrium
 The concept of an equilibrium for this model is a natural generalization of a
 competitive equilibrium for the private goods model.
 DEFINITION 2.4: A competitive equilibrium under the government G in the
 private ownership economy ' is an (I+J + 1)-tuple E = (x, m'), (z', s} of
 consumer decisions, producer decisions, and a price system such that: (i) (x', m ') E
 Ai(mMis, s, wi(s)) all i (preference maximization) where the wealth of i is:
 w (s) p w1)l+X1i011T1(s); (ii) z'E?1(s) all j (profit maximization); and (iii)
 (X1 (x - w1), y (m)) = Y1 z' (supply equals demand).
 2.5. The Quadratic Government
 In our previous paper [5] this model was developed to examine the so-called
 "free rider problem." We defined a specific government such that if faced with its
 particular allocation and tax rules, each consumer would find it in his self-interest
 to correctly reveal his true demand for the public goods, even though he could
 falsely report his demand without fear of detection. Both Fundamental Theorems
 of Welfare Economies were proved: A competitive equilibrium under this
 government is Pareto optimal (Non-wastefullness Theorem) and every Pareto
 optimal allocation is a competitive allocation following, if necessary, some
 redistribution of initial endowments (Unbiasedness Theorem).
 The class of government we analyzed, called the quadratic (Q) government,7 is
 6As the allocation rule y( * ) for our government depends only on joint messages m (see (2.2)
 below), henceforth y(m, s) = y(m). Also, throughout we use the notation
 M)i(- m1m -1,mm i+1. i m)
 m/m _ m 1,. .., i-lmi mi+l I).
 7 In our earlier paper we called this government the optimal government referring to the property
 that competitive equilibria under this government are Pareto optimal. However, as other mechanisms
 (see introduction) also have this property, the label "optimal" seems no longer appropriate and
 possibly misleading.
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 specified by:
 GQ={M, y( ), (Ci( ))} where
 (i) M = RK,
 (2.2) (ii) y(m)= mh,
 h
 (iii) C (m, s) = atiq 2 E h+YI 1 m Ri 2
 where Xi a' = 1, y > 0 are parameters, and
 1
 lyA A(M)i W 1 E Mh,
 I-1 hoi
 (2.3)
 {i2W=(rmi()2 Z (m -,u)2 i2 h T1
 0M )I-2hgi -
 Each consumer's message m' may be interpreted as his demand (which may be
 negative) since the allocation is just the sum of all consumers' messages
 (demands). Each consumer's tax consists of a proportional share of the total cost
 plus an amount increasing in the squared deviation of his demand from the
 average of the others' demands and decreasing in the sum of squared deviations of
 the others' demands from their average.8
 Another interpretation of a consumer's message as reported willingness to pay
 is provided in Groves and Ledyard [5].
 REMARK: It should be noted that both Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
 Economics remain valid for some variants in the choice of the parameters a' and 'y
 in the cost rules C'( * ) of Go. First of all, y can be permitted to depend on the
 prices s as long as it remains positive. As specified in (2.2), the cost functions
 Ci(- ) are not homogeneous of degree one in prices and thus, the consumers'
 decision rules ("demand functions") are not homogeneous of degree zero in prices
 and income. However, if y*(s) = y * Ilsil is substituted for y in (2.2), homogeneity
 will be assured without affecting the validity of the optimality theorems in [5] or
 the existence results presented below. Similarly, parameter a' may be made
 dependent on prices s and also on the other agents' messages, mM't, and other
 potentially observable data of the model such as endowments. They may also be
 negative. The only constraint is the equality Xi a' = 1 which must be satisfied, at
 least in equilibrium. In proving existence below we consider a variant in which a'
 is the proportion of agent i's wealth to aggregate wealth.
 8 An equivalent alternative formulation is
 C(m, s) = aq _ mh + _(mi_m)2_ 2(mh _ )2] where m=I)m
  I Ih JI h
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 2.6. Existence and Potential Bankruptcy
 It would be nice if we could now list a set of standard assumptions in general
 equilibrium analysis which would be sufficient to guarantee the existence of a
 competitive equilibrium under the quadratic government. Unfortunately, if
 private goods consumption is bounded below (as we assume) this is not possible.
 The crux of the difficulty lies in the fact that the tax rules Ci( * ) of the
 government are potentially confiscatory of a consumer's total endowment. For
 example, suppose all consumers but one are identical and have such strong
 preferences for the public good that they are willing to spend any positive wealth
 on the public good while the remaining consumer, 1, is indifferent to the public
 good and thus always attempts to minimize his tax. Since he is atypical, in addition
 to paying his fixed share a' of whatever quantity is purchased, he must also pay for
 the deviation of his message from the others' mean: [y(I - 1)/2I](m' - _ 1)2. Each
 one of the similar consumers thus will have his tax reduced from his fixed share a i
 so that in aggregate the similar consumers pay their fixed shares Xi ?1 a' less the
 amount [,y(I- 1)/2I](ml -_ 1)2 received from the atypical consumer. Now
 suppose each consumer's fixed share a h is set equal to his relative wealth
 w wi . (If not, it is easy to construct examples to bankrupt any consumer with a
 greater fixed share.) Then, at any Nash equilibrium, m', the similar consumers are
 spending all their wealth on the public good and the atypical consumer 1 is
 minimizing his cost. Thus
 E Ci(A)= E wj+Y(I-1)(Al_ A)2
 iol is 2I A
 y( A)_Y(I-1)( A1 A 1)2
 2I
 which implies that
 y(I -1) (Al A 1 2
 Y( A)=__ __ ___W i___ __Al: Al ym)= i+ > w1 since m bt
 Y.a'
 iol
 as 1 is not similar to the other consumers. But as X C'(m) =ym)>X w' and
 x'(m)= w-C'(m)=0 for all i # 1,
 xl(m) =Z xi(m) = W w -_ Ci(m) =i wi - y(m)<O.
 i i i
 Since 1 is cost minimizing at ml, yet x (m)<0, consumer 1 is bankrupt at any
 response he might make.
 More generally, this type of bankruptcy arises if (i) there exists sufficient
 diversity in the preferences for public goods, and simultaneously, (ii) aggregate
 demand, when the fixed cost share prices a' are equal to relative wealth, is close to
 the maximum feasible output of the public good for the economy. When these two
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 conditions exist, there may not be enough private good left over after producing
 the demanded high quantity of public good to serve as the medium of transfer to
 compensate for the diversity of tastes. To avoid the bankruptcy problem we must
 rule out preferences leading to near total public good production.
 For completeness it should be noted that potential bankruptcy problems are not
 unique to our model but exist, for example, in private goods only competitive
 models when the reasonable assumption is made that initial endowments are not
 in the consumers' consumption sets. Green [4] confronts this issue in a temporary
 equilibrium model with pre-existing contracts while Debreu [2] analyzes this
 difficulty in the standard model. These papers suggest that this is a fundamental
 and complicated problem.
 3. EXISTENCE OF A GENERAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE
 QUADRATIC GOVERNMENT
 3.1. The Assumptions
 For the general economy defined in Section 2 ' = {(X1, <i, t)4, (Zj), (0)l} we
 assume the following standard conditions of general equilibrium analysis:9
 STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS: ' satisfies, for every i and j:
 (a) X' = Xi x R+; X R C DL, Xi is closed, convex, and has a lower bound for -;
 (b.1) for every (xi, y) E WC, there exists an xi such that (xi, y) E kC and (xi, y) >
 (xi, y) (nonsatiation in private goods);
 (b.2) for every (X-i y)E X, the sets {(x1, y) E X1I(x1, y)~t(f1, y)} and {(x1, y) E
 X1I(x1, y):i(xV, y)} are closed (continuity of preferences);
 (b.3) for every (x',y) and (J1, 7)E C1, if (x1,y)> (f1,7) and O<A<1, then
 A (xi, y) + (1 -A )(x, J ) > E(x , y) (convexity of preferences);
 (c) w' E int Xi (feasibility of the initial endowment);
 (d. 1) 0 e Z' (possibility of inaction);
 (d.2) Z is closed and convex where Z = X;, Zj is the aggregate production set of
 if;
 (d.3) Z r- (-Z) c {0} (irreversibility of production);
 (d.4) Z v (-Q2) where l2 R L+K (free disposal).
 As indicated in Section 2, the standard assumptions alone are not sufficient to
 prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium under the government G0,
 because of the possibility some consumers may be driven into bankruptcy when
 other agents maximize preferences or profits. Bankruptcy may result under the
 tax rules of Go either if all private goods prices are driven to zero or if the demand
 Our standard assumptions are nearly identical to Debreu's [1] for the private goods only economy
 and are quite similar to Milleron's or Foley's assumptions for proving the existence of a Lindahl
 equilibrium.
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 for public goods is too great.'0 To rule out these possibilities we make two
 additional assumptions. First, we assume technology permits the production of
 more of every public good than is possible at any attainable state. Second, we
 assume that at a feasible allocation, if every consumer is too close to the boundary
 of the private goods portion of his consumption set, then all consumers would
 prefer some feasible allocation at which the amount of public goods were
 smaller."
 Formally, let A denote the set of attainable states for the economy E:
 (3.1) A={a=((xi'y,(zj))|(xi,y)Et', zi E Z ( (x ci), y) zi
 Note that A depends only on the consumption sets X' = Xi x R , the production
 sets Z', and the aggregate endowment of private goods, i w = c=W. Let Ay denote
 the set of attainable public goods bundles:
 (3.2) Ay- {y E Rl+ithere exists a'E A with y' = y}.
 Our first additional assumption is:
 ASSUMPTION (d.5): Given any y E Ay, (zr, y + c 1) E Z for some c > 0 and some
 z, E R , where 1-( 1) E SK
 Let H denote those public goods bundles in Ay that are bounded away from the
 upper boundary by the amount 1/y where y is the parameter on the quadratic
 terms of the tax rules for the quadratic government GO:
 (3.3) H-{yEAyIy+ leAy}
 Our second additional assumption is:
 ASSUMPTION (e): If a = ((x'), y, (z')) e A and y - H, then there exists some
 a' = ((xi ), y', (z" )) E A with y' E H such that (xi, y') > i(x1, y) for all i.
 Note that Assumption (e) can be satisfied only if H is not empty. Thus,
 minimally the amount l/y> 0 of every public good must be compatible with
 attainability. Of course, the larger is y, the less restrictive is the requirement.
 However since Ay = {0} for a private goods only economy, such economies are not
 covered by the existence theorem below. But if it is assumed that public goods are
 10 Both Milleron [7] and Foley [3] in proving the existence of Lindahl equilibria need assumptions to
 rule out private goods prices being driven to zero. Foley assumes the aggregate technology set of the
 economy is a cone and that every public good is producible. Milleron assumes initial endowments (of
 private and public goods) are in the interior of consumers' consumption sets and that there is an
 attainable allocation such that each producer is in the interior of his production set. These assumptions
 imply our Assumption (d.5).
 " Another way of stating this is that any Pareto optimal allocation leaves a (possibly small) finite
 amount of commodities for private consumption. As will be seen in Assumption (e) or (e'), the amount
 necessary depends inversely on -y.
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 never undesirable at zero levels, then the zero point, y = 0, may be adjoined to H
 and the theorem will cover the private goods only economy also.
 A weaker but more complicated assumption may be substituted for Assump-
 tion (e). Let
 P = {a E AI1a' E A such that (xi, y') > i (x1, y) for all i}.
 P is the set of (weak) Pareto optimal allocations. Under Assumptions (a)-
 (d.5), if a E P, then there exists a support (price) vector s in
 S=JsER |||5||J=11P1+1kqk= 1 such that s*z :s*z' for all z'EP(z)-
 {z E RL+K |Z = 1i zi for some a E A}. Let S(a) be the set of all such support prices.
 These prices are not necessarily equilibrium prices as they depend only on the
 technology and the Pareto optimal allocation a. The weaker assumption is:
 ASSUMPTION (e'): If a E P, then for all s E S(a),
 q Y <[w(s) min p ]-
 3.2. The Existence Theorem: Statement
 The theorem we prove is as follows:
 THEOREM 3.1: The economy with public goods ' has a competitive equilibrium
 under the quadratic government Go under Assumptions (a), (b.1)-(b.3), (c),
 (d. 1)-(d.5), and (e) when the parameters a of the tax rules for GQ are specified by:
 wO(s) - min p x i
 (3.4) ai(s)= xi-X
 E [Wh(S)_ min p * xj
 h xhExh
 (where wO(s) = p * w1 + Z1i 011T17(s) is consumer i's wealth at prices s; see Definition
 2.4).
 REMARK: Restriction (3.4) on the parameters a' may be removed if Assump-
 tion (e) or (e') is suitably strengthened. For example, consider the following
 assumption.
 ASSUMPTION (e"): If a E P then, for all s E S(a) and all i,
 a q. [y +_1] < w'(s)-min p.x.
 Theorem 3.1 is valid if (e) is replaced by (e") and restrictions (3.4) are
 eliminated. (Also, in Assumption (e') and (e"), the scalar (l/'y) can be replaced by
 the smaller scalar [I/2 y(I - 1)].)
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 Although the importance of prices in Assumptions (e') and (e") may seem
 strange, it should be noted that the tax rules Cl( * ) specify payment only in the
 unit of account and the purpose of Assumption (e') or (e") is to ensure that there is
 a sufficient amount of the unit of account to carry out the required transfers.
 Assumption (e) is stronger (than (e')) since it requires sufficient amount of every
 private commodity to be available to carry out the transfers if the tax rules were to
 require payment in that particular commodity.
 3.3. Proof of Existence Theorem
 We present a numbered outline of the proof of Theorem 3.1 which follows in
 many details Debreu's existence proof for a private goods only economy. Thus,
 where possible, we refer to the relevant paragraphs of Debreu's proof in [1].
 (1) The set of attainable states A defined in (3.1) is nonempty, convex, and
 compact.
 PROOF: Same as in Debreu [1].
 (2) Compactify the message space M: For every t : 1, let
 Mt - m' EMI- t m It, all k}.
 Clearly Mt is nonempty, convex, and compact for all t.
 (3) Compactify the economy 9: Let R" and Z' denote the projections of the
 attainable set A onto X' and Z' respectively. By (1), X and Z' are compact and
 convex.
 For any number n e R, let BN(n) denote the N-dimensional cube centered at
 the origin with edges of length 2n; i.e.,
 B (n)={gER JJ|giJ-,n all i =1, ... ., n}.
 Given any t > 1 let n (t) e St be sufficiently large so that (i) t, Z' are contained in
 BL+K(N(t)), all i, j; (ii) Yt y(M)-{y E S Y=y(m) = h m,mEMt}c
 BK(n (t)); and (iii) BL(n (t)) contains the lower bound of Xi, all i (see (a)). Define
 X iXr BL(n (t)), S'- = rB BL+ (n (t)), Z'- Z' r BL (n (t)). Clearly these
 spaces are nonempty, convex, and compact for all t.
 (4) Define compactified supply correspondences +f(.) and profit functions
 ( * ) as the restrictions of 4'(* ) respectively, to Z'. As in Debreu [1, p. 86, 4 &
 5], r'( ) is continuous and q'(.) is nonempty and convex valued and upper
 semi-continuous (-u.s.c., hereafter) for every s e RL+K
 (A) Discussion: It is not possible at this point in our proof to follow Debreu and
 compactify the consumer's decision correspondence 3'(.) and proceed to the
 compactified excess demand correspondence. As we have noted above, under the
 tax rules of G0, a consumer's budget set 131(m)i(, s; w1(s)) (see Definitions 2.3
 and 2.4) may be empty for some mM and s; i.e., consumer i may be bankrupt.
 Although Assumptions (d.5) and (e) are sufficient to prove no consumer is
 bankrupt at a "fixed point" which we show defines an equilibrium, to prove the
 "fixed point" exists, we need a nonempty, convex valued, and u.s.c. decision
 correspondence for each consumer.
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 Thus, we define a pseudo-decision correspondence which agrees with the
 decision correspondence 8i() (see Definition 2.3) if the consumer is not bank-
 rupt, but allows him to choose cost-minimizing consumption and message pairs
 (xi, m') if he is bankrupt. However, for technical reasons, whenever strict cost-
 minimization would eliminate the bankruptcy (this can happen only if Xh ri m +
 m k = Yk (m) < 0 for some k where mr' minimizes C'(m, s) overM) we allow him to
 cost minimize only to the brink to solvency.
 (5) Therefore, let 3'(mM, s; wi) denote consumer i's pseudo decision cor-
 respondence and be defined by:
 8 i(MM, 5; wi) if d'(m), s) < wi,
 a(m), s; wi) .(m)'(, s; wi) if d s(m)i( ) =
 m M(m)l( 5; w) if d(n)i(, s)> w',
 where
 di(m)i s) min p xi + min C (M/rm, s)
 xi'EX' m'eM
 s.t. y (m)-O
 is the minimum cost to get into his consumption set, and {i( ) is defined by:
 (m)(, s; ww)-{ (x, m ,i)E-X1xMI.xi minimizesp x' overXi andeither
 (a) mT i= m iM s) = mni minimizes ci(m, s) over M
 subject to rm n { i_ } as ,k <0, every k; if
 C1(m/Ln, s)> w' -minp *x, or (b) mr maximizes
 q min{0, y(rm)} subject to (i) pn2{ (kI1)k} as
 kl< }O, every k, and (ii) C1(m, s) > wi- min p * xi; if
 Ci(m/n/; s) sw -minp xi}.
 (B) Discussion: In the definition above the pseudo-decision (--p.-decision,
 hereafter) correspondence, the consumer's wealth wi is an exogenous variable.
 Typically, for private ownership general equilibrium models, income is endo-
 genously determined as the value of the initial endowment, plus the shares of
 firms' profits: wO(s) p * ai + 5 1011' (s).
 However, in our model, since the p.-decision correspondence allows a
 consumer's decision (x', m') to violate the budget constraint under some circum-
 stances, if wi is set equal to wi(s) a situation may arise in which the value of
 aggregate excess demand is strictly positive, i.e., Walras' Law may be violated.
 Since our proof requires us to show Walras' Law holds, we must modify the
 income determination process. Loosely speaking, in the presence of any
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 bankruptcy, we invoke a redistribution mechanism. All nonbankrupt consumers
 are charged in proportion to their solvency leyel to cover the deficits of the
 bankrupt consumers.
 (6) Define consumer i's degree of solvency (if positive) or bankruptcy (if
 negative) by:
 b'(m E, s)--wi(s) -di(m)i(, s)
 where di( * ) is defined above at (5). Let r1(m, s) denote i's assessment for
 bankruptcy (bankruptcy tax) and be defined by
 4 Oif b'(m)'(, s)<O; i.e. if i is bankrupt;
 r, (m, s) - min b '(m , s) x b bh(mh, s)l, b (m , s)J
 h bh<O
 bh<O
 if b'(m) ,s)>0.
 Note that when all consumers are solvent; i.e., b i 0, then r1 = 0, i.e., bankruptcy
 taxes are zero. Note also that i's bankruptcy tax will never bankrupt him;
 i.e., b'(m)'(, s)>O implies after tax solvency b'(m)'(, s)-r1(m, s)-
 (w'(s) - r'(m, s)) - d'(m)'(, s) > 0.
 Now, the consumer's p. -decision correspondence (with endogenous income
 (wealth) determination) is defined simply by:
 Si(m , S; w1(s)-r (i(m, s)).
 (7) We now compactify the consumer's p.-decision correspondence 6(*)
 by substituting the compactified sets Mt, X, X', and Z' everywhere in the
 definition of all elements of the model for the original sets M, X', X', and Z'.
 This process will define the functions or correspondences w t( ), a ' C'('),
 i3t( ), 5t( ), d (* ), 8(. ), ), b'(* ), r'(* ), and finally, 8'(* ), the compactified
 p.-decision correspondence. Note that the tax rules C'(* ) were also compactified
 in the process.
 The compactified p.-decision correspondence 5tf *) can be shown to have the
 required properties:
 LEMMA 1: 8t i) is nonempty, convex valued and u.s.c. on MIx where
 S = {S = (p, q) e l+ Il Pl + Xk qk JI5Sj = 1, IPIp >O} is the price simplex open at
 IPII = ?.
 PROOF: Straightforward, but tediously detailed.
 Note that for the definition of a'( * ) given in (3.4), if lpjII= 0, a1(s) may not be
 well defined.
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 (8) Let the space of excess demands for the compactified economy be defined
 by:
 Et={e = ((w _i),y)Z,zixieXiyeYz iEZi}
 and let S, denote the closed subset of prices:
 SV-{s ESltIIpIjI BV}, for every 1>v>O.
 Clearly, the sets Et and S, are nonempty, compact, and convex since X', Y-
 y(MI), and Z' are.
 Now define the "maximal valuation of excess demand" correspondence
 ,lt, : Ete - S, for every t, v by:
 rqt,(e) = s ES,js *e ? s*e forallsESI}.
 As in Debreu [1, (1) of (5.6)], nt,(* ) is nonempty, convex, and u.s.c. at all e E Et for
 all t > 1/y, 1 >v> O.
 (9) Define the "fixed point" mapping Pt,: Et x x S, - Et x MI x S, by
 pt.(e, m, s) = {(e', mi', s') E Et x MI x S,e' = (xi-co), y') -z zi
 for y' = y(m'), (xi, min) E gt(m, s), ziE E 4(s), s' E tv(e)J.
 LEMMA 2: The correspondence Ptv(* ) is nonempty, convex valued, and u.s.c. at
 every point in EtxMI xSfor every t>1/ y, 1>v>0.
 PROOF: Straightforward.
 Thus, by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, for every (t, v)> (1/-y, O)(v < 1),
 Ptv(*) has a fixed point; i.e., there exists
 Etv = ((xtv, Mt.) (z',,), st,) such that
 ()(xitv, m ,) E 3t(Mtv, Stv)I
 (ii) z t Eoj(stv),
 (iii) St. E qt,(etV) where et, = ( (xt,v -i'), y (mtv)) -z tv
 (C) Discussion: It is not possible at this point in the proof to follow Debreu in
 one step and convert Et, directly into an equilibrium (or, rather a pseudo-
 equilibrium for the compactified economy) by showing Walras' Law holds, thus
 that excess demand is nonpositive, and hence that the free disposal assumption
 permits a modified production plan with no loss in profits but which eliminates
 all excess supply. The difficulty is two-fold. First, in order to show Walras' Law
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 holds even on the truncated price simplex S, it is necessary to show that the
 aggregate amount of bankruptcy is less than the aggregate solvency. Second to
 show Walras' Law holds on the entire simplex, we must consider the sequence of
 fixed points E, as v goes to zero.
 (10) LEMMA 3: For every t > 1/ y, 1 > v > 0, at the fixed point Et,
 (a) E b (mt, stv) > 0,
 (b) y 0
 (c) Stv * et, =0 and thus, s * et, - ? for all s e S,.
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 (11) For fixed t> 1/y, consider the sequence of fixed points Et as v o-0. Since Etv
 for every < 1 is in the compact space x (XX x Mt) X.Z' x S where S closure
 s {s c{ R+KI lsll = s * = 1}, the sequence has a limit point E'=
 ((Xt, mt), (zi), S^t). It is easy to see that at the limit point st et = 0 and s et 0 for
 every s e S. Thus, by the same argument as in Debreu [1], excess demand et can be
 shown to be nonpositive, i.e., e t 0.
 Thus, by the assumption of free disposal (d. 4), there exists a net aggregate
 production plan Zt e Z such that Zt t + et. Let (zP) be such that zi and t = Zt
 (12) LEMMA 4: Consider the point ?t = ((Xt, Mt/) (zi), St)
 (a e = ( (Ai -i)~ y(At)) - Z = ?s (a) et=(S(t coi),
 (b) zE St
 (c) 1 r(St) t St
 (d w(At)= Wti(A^), (d) w St t)S
 A j
 (e) min p *xi= min Pt, x.
 xIeXi xiEXi
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 (D) Discussion: Lemma 4 establishes two of the three properties gt must satisfy
 to be an equilibrium. Thus, to prove the existence theorem we have remaining
 only to show that for some t> 1/y,
 (c) (Ai A j) E _osi( A ij(, A; Wi(A^ )).
 This we will show in three steps. First, we show (xt, Mrt) E St ) which requires
 that A5 $ 0. Second, we show that for some t sufficiently large, the compactification
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 bounds on the message space are not binding at the point mr, i.e., - t M <mt <It 1
 all i. This will establish that x t, m t3 im(m S't). Finally we show for this sufficiently
 large t that no consumer is bankrupt or just barely solvent so that ( A, A) E
 Mi(6ti(, St; w(t)) as required.
 (13) LEMMA 5: For every t > 1/ y, at the point ?t, (a) Pt 0 and thus, (b)
 (A, Ai) e 8t(mt A).
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 (14) LEMMA 6: For t sufficiently large,
 (a) -t <mzt<Itl for every i and
 (b) (x t, m t) i (m, S^t
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 (E) Discussion: By Lemmas 4 and 6, for some sufficiently large t, there exists
 Et= ((xCt rht), (Mt), 5) such that
 (at' (x it, m t) E i(Mt S^t)
 ($ i E i(At (p3) ZtE S
 (y) (, (X t _ )y (Mt)) =E t
 Let E*-((xi*, mi), (z ), S*) = Et for the sufficiently large t and let y*=y(m*).
 To show now that (xi*, mi*)e8i(m)1(*, s*; wi(s*)), we need to show that no
 consumer is bankrupt or in his minimum worth condition at E*, i.e. that
 bi(m*, s*) >0 for all i, which will then mean that no bankruptcy taxes are
 assessed, i.e., rl(m*, s*) = 0 all i. Thus,
 (xi,i**)re 6i(m)i(*,s*;wi(s*)) if ri(m*, s*) =O
 and
 (xi*, mt*) E Si(m)i(* S*,wi(s*)) if bi(m*, s*)>O.
 To show bi(m*, s*) > 0 we will show that Assumption (e) will imply that y* =
 y (m *) E H and then use this fact to show b >0, thus completing the proof of
 Theorem 3.1.
 (15) LEMMA 7: At t*,
 (a) y* = y(m*) EH
 (b) * *+1 *2< (wi(s min p Xi)
 y ixiex
 (c) bi(m)i(*. s*)>0 all i.
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 PROOF: See Appendix.
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 APPENDIX
 This appendix contains the proofs of Lemmas 3-7.
 PROOF OF LEMMA 3: (a) Suppose to the contrary that Xi b'(m)'(, s,,) S 0. Then, by definition
 it 5tv)= lb} as b'( 0.
 Thus, for every i,
 d'(m)(, st,)-=w(st,) - b(m)t 5tv){ } wt(st,) - r(mt, st) as b4 < Jo.
 Now, for each public good k, either (i) yk(mtv) = Xh Mktv > 0 or (ii) Yk(mtv) O 0-
 (i) If yk (mtv) > O, then m h h - -(a (Stv)ll (I- _))qkt, for all h.
 (This follows since each consumer h is minimizing Ct (mt./m, st.) as t s(t) , st) w t(stv) -
 r St.). Also, when yk(mv) > 0, none of the constraints on the cost minimizations are binding.)
 But then, Xh M ktv = Xh l ktv- (I/v(I - 1))qktv = Xh m ktv- (I/vy(I - 1))qkt, implying that qkt = 0-
 Thus, qkt. * Yk(mtv) = 0 if yk(mtv) >0 -
 (ii) If Yk(mtv) < 0, then qkt.Yk(Mtv) > 0 as qkt, 2 0 all k.
 Thus, in either event, since all consumers are cost minimizing,
 ()qtV * y (mt.) = Y. C,(mt., St.) --- O.
 Now by definition of b-(*) and w,(),
 i i x EXit i
 -_ m in Ct(m, /m, s+S) i m'EMt
 y(mtI/m')O
 >- min C'(mt/m1, st.)
 i m eMt
 y(mim/m'm>O
 since w1cintX',pt, $0, and nr'(stv) 0 as 0E Y" by (d.l). Now, if y(mt,)30, then
 minmM,y(mtp/m);o C (mt./m', st.) = C'(mt,s st,) and (*) and (**) imply Xi b > -IX C'(m st, ) 2 0
 contradicting the assumption that 1i b t 0.
 But, if b' 3 0 for any i, then mtA 3-( - I-1)i{,, implying that y(mt,) 0 O. Thus, b'(m stv) < O for
 every i, which implies that r'(mtvs st,) = 0 and also that
 (xxt,, mt,) E t(m)t{, st,; w(st,)) for every i.
 However, then
 C't(mtv stv) 2 mWt(stv)m- rin Pt. x >0
 as above. Then
 Y- C't(mtv, stv) > O
 contradicting (*). Hence
 Z b'(m t'j, stv) > 0
 as was to be shown.
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 (b) Since Xi b > 0, b,(m stv) > 0 for some i which implies m, 3 - (I - 1),tv and thus y(mtV) 3 0 as
 was to be shown.
 (c) At the fixed point Et,, for every i, either (i) (x,v, mt,) E 5, which implies by nonsatiation (b. 1) and
 convexity (b.3) that
 Ptv * x rv + C,(mt,, s,,) = w,(s,) - r(mt,, S,v), or
 (ii) d,(m t' , stv) = w,(st.) - r(mt., st.) which also implies that
 Ptv* x + C,(mt,, st,) = w,(stv) - r(mt, St.), or
 (iii) d,(m t' , st.) > w,(st.) which implies that (x',, m',) e ,. Therefore, from (5) (a) and (5) (b) above,
 where 6' is defined,
 t xXV + C s,v) s w,(stv) - b,(m) ,vf stv)
 where strict inequality holds only if
 C,(mtv,1n', stv) < min C,(mtv/m1, stv)
 m rsMt
 which can occur only if yk(mtv) < 0 for some k, a possibility excluded by (b).
 Thus,
 Ptv E x ,+ -C, = -w,(stv) rt_ t.b
 b,'O bt<O
 Or, using the definitions of w,, r", and the fact that -i C = qtv y (m,),
 (Ptv (x, Wco), qtV*ymv)-, t , *te,
 =1 b' / r
 i~~~~~~~~~~~ j i
 bt<O btaO
 =0
 since ;i b, > 0 by (a).
 Thus, since stv E 71tv (etv), 0 = s,v etv 3 s etv for every s e Sv, completing (c) and the proof of Lemma
 3.
 PROOF OF LEMMA 4: (a) is immediate from the definition of iz.
 (b) Since s^t * e^, = 0, by the construction of z', st z =s z t.
 By the u.s.c. of 44( * t), ^j(A ) But since Et is attainable, zi e Zi and as St = S^ * .Z E4 .(SA
 Also, as zF is in the interior of the cube BL+K(n (t)) containing Z' and Z' is convex, St e 4"(S), thus
 proving (b).
 Statements (c), (d), and (e) are readily verified.
 PROOF OF LEMMA 5: (b) follows from (a) by the u.s.c. of ( ) at t if p #0. To prove (a), suppose
 pt = 0. By Assumption (d.5), for some Z, E R L and c > 0, (zx, zyt + c 1) Ei Z. Let (z) be such that
 Z' EZ' andVz'=Z.
 By Lemma 4, zit S t'^) which implies s * z > s*. Thus,
 st t -i=st qt S Z t 3 ^.EZi st z =qt . zy
 A A
 =q^ (U+c1)= 2 1+c41 q>q q contradiction.
 PROOF OF LEMMA 6: (b) follows from (a) since x, int BL(n(t)) (as x is attainable), and i int
 Mt. Thus, the compactification contraints are not binding anywhere. Then by convexity of Xi,
 preferences, and the budget correspondence ,3 ( ),the result follows.
 To show (a), we first show m, <Itl for t sufficiently large and then - tl <imt.
 CLAIM 1: m, Itl for every t sufficiently large, for all i.
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 PROOF: Suppose not. Then for some public good k and consumer i, there is a sequence tn A 00 as
 n Zoo with mn'k = Itn for all n. But, for every tn
 Yk ' tn ) E_ m tnk = Itn + E m tnk -> Itn - - 1 )tn = tn 1 ?? .
 h hoi
 But Yk(rAtn) is bounded above for every tn since it is attainable. The contradiction establishes Claim 1.
 CLAIM 2: m t> - t for every t sufficiently large.
 PROOF: Suppose not. Then for some public good k and consumer i, there is a sequence tn A cc as
 n Zoo with Mitnk = -tn for all n. By Lemma 3, Yk(rMt) 3 0 every t and P. Thus Yk(rtn) 3 0 for every tn.
 Thus, A i k < A tk and hence i is not in a bankrupt or minimum wealth condition. Thus, i is maximizing
 preferences at each point tn. Also, Yk(rt ) 30 implies IhIi mthnk 3 t, all n and thus, [(I- nk
 tn k) -tn.
 Since (xt, 8 (, '( )M E int BL+K(n(t)) (by attainability), by convexity of T' (Assumption a) and
 nonsatiation (Assumption b.1), there is some ' E X' such that (it, y^) > ( 9
 Furthermore, by the compactness of the attainable set, convexity of W', continuity and convexity of
 preferences (b.2 and b.3), there exists a small strictly positive number c > 0, such that for every t
 (i h) (4it, 9 + c) > t yt) and (it, y) E tit.
 Also, since the attainable set is compact, there exists a maximum distance such that if (2t, Yt) is
 attainable, there exists some cE X' within; of t; i.e., IIx - XII | ;, and (4 t)> , 9
 Now as in (Groves and Ledyard [5] (6) in Proof of Theorem 4.1), for every tn, since (itj t) >i A , A t(xtn Ytn)
 Ptni*xt + CY y Ytn > Pn*x tn + CY y Ytn . 
 where
 A (A)cA + y((I 1)/I)(ii A- C y =- aEtn (stn )qtn + '(I1)/I m tn Au tn)-
 Thus, for every n,
 ?<Ptn * xtn- x tn ) ttn (Stn )qtnk + I ) mtnk As tnk
 and since ((I - 1)/I)(rhtk - Ai t,nk) S - tn, and a'(A)4tnk > 1,
 ? < At * _ AlXtn + [1- /tn]C AI IItnX + (1-'Ytn)C
 Z;+ (-'Ytn)C
 =(+ c) - (,yc)tn for all n.
 But for t, sufficiently large (Z+ c) - (,yc)tn < 0; contradiction, thus establishing Claim 2 and Lemma 6.
 Q.E.D.
 PROOF OF LEMMA 7: (a) Suppose y* 0 H. Then by Assumption e, there is some attainable
 allocation a'E A, y' E H such that, (x', y') > i(x' , y*) for every i.
 Then, since at least one consumer is strictly solvent by Lemma 3, by the same argument used in
 Lemma 6 (Claim 2),
 p** (x -xi )+[ a(s*) +( 1)0
 every i with strict inequality for at least one i. Thus,
 p* *Z (x'-x) + q* (y'- y*) > O, or
 i
 p* ExP + q* * y'> p* * E xi* + q* * y* = E wi(s*) (by Lemma 3)
 Z_ w1(s*) =Zp* . 0 w+ZZ O)1T)Y(s*):--Zp* &J . -*
i i i
 =ZEp* * wi?+S* jE(xi _ i,S y,] =ZEp*.* xi'?+q* * y,.
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 We have a contradiction; thus (a) is established.
 (b) y* E H implies there exists a'E A, y' = y* + (l/y)l and (Xi (x' - '), y') = X1 z'.
 Thus
 p* Ex +q* * ._ si+s* . z1'sp* . o'+XX oiii(s*
 I ~~~i j i iij
 = w i(s*).
 Hence
 *1 q*. yP=q** y*+ q* * Wi(s*)-p* * _x"-i E(wi(s*)- min.p* xi).
 y i i ~ ~ ~~~~~i x' =x'
 Since q < 1 all k,
 1 *2 *+1 q** y* q <q y* +q* * s (wi(s*) min.p* x') if q*0
 V V i x'eX
 and
 *+1 p*2i *=q *y q <E(wi(s*)-iin p* xi) if q*=0
 y i x'eX
 since wi e int xi and p* $ 0. Thus (b) is proved.
 (c) By definition
 bi(m)i(, s*)=(wi(s*)- min p* * xi)- min Ci(m*/mi, s*).
 y(m*/m ')?O
 By (b) and the definition of a i(s*),
 * +1 12 (A) bi(m)i(*,s*)>ai(s*)[q * y *-q*2j- min Ci(m*/mi, s*).
 y(m*/m')2O
 Now, since y* y(m*) ?0 and (xi*, mi*) c gi(m* s*),
 (B) if bi(m)i(*, s*)0, then C(m*, s*)= min Ci(m*/mi,s*)
 m'
 y(m*/m')--O
 which implies that mi* s,m and
 a i(s*)q* + y((I - 1)/I)(mi* - y 5*) >0.
 Thus
 O? (mi* _i* _ aS(s*)Iq
 which implies
 (M i* i*)2S< (ai(s*))2I2 *2
 Hence
 CO(m* s*)= a(s*)q* . y*?2{ (mi* -i*)2 (&ri*)2]
 Sai(s*)q* Y*+ I (a1 i(s 2q*2
 2y(I - 1)
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 Combining (A), (B), and (C), if bi(m)i(*, s*) s 0, then
 0> bi (m)i(*, s*) > aX i(s*)(q** y +- q*2) _ Ci(m*, s*)OQ,
 yielding a contradiction. Thus, bi(m)i(*, s*) > 0, all i. Q.E.D.
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